The question posed by the organizers of this symposium is a crucial one, in large part because most people will think the answer is obvious. Yet whether that obvious answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’ depends entirely on who is answering the question and what they take the terms “critique” and “secular” to mean. Many within the US academy, I think, will find the question redundant, presuming that critique is defined in terms of its secularity and vice versa. For those who presume that critique is always the critique of something, that this something is associated with a putatively unquestioned authority, and that religion is, in its very nature, grounded in an unquestioned and unquestioning appeal to such an authority, critique and secularity are mutually interdependent phenomena. One might even push this a step further and suggest that, for those who would answer the question with an unqualified ‘yes,’ the appeal to any authority other than reason is always, in some way, religious. From this perspective the transmutation of physical force into authority has been called “theological” or “mystical,” and hence has been seen as participating in the irrational logic of the religious. (Whether this is a good, bad, or simply inevitable is currently the subject of heated debate.)

There are those, then, who insist – often very loudly – that critique is antithetical to religion, given the putative rationality of the former and irrationality of the later. To these secularist critics of religion – most famously at the moment people like Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Richard Dawkins – I find myself asking how anyone can possibly look at, say, Christianity – just to give an example close to home – and claim that its practitioners do not engage in critique? Yes, a certain kind of secularist
interlocutor might respond, but the social, political, moral, and theoretical critique of
authority leveled by Christians is always tendered either on grounds other than those
specific to Christianity or on the unquestioned authority of Christianity itself. The first
assertion is patently false. Christians critique that which lies outside the domain of
religion on the basis of specifically Christian claims – this is precisely what bothers so
many about Christianity in the contemporary US context. To the second one must ask
what does it means to talk about the authority of Christianity. The authority of the Bible,
one might respond. Yet there is not now nor has there ever been any agreement among
Christians about what it means to speak of the authority of the Bible or even about what
constitutes the Bible, to say nothing of what this contested entity tells Christians they
ought to do or think. Some of the earliest Christian creedal formulations claim explicitly
that the Bible is not the ultimate source of authority for Christians. (A number of other
candidates are put forward, including the very formulae themselves – just the kind of
putative circularity religion’s contemporary despisers love to exploit. Note that I am
making any claim here for the rationality of religion, however, but simply for its critical
and self-critical capacities.) Every one of these issues has been and continues to be
contested among those who call themselves Christians.

In other words, Christians critique Christianity and that which lies outside the
boundaries of Christianity all the time. They constantly contest even what it means to be
a Christian. And the same can be said for every other religion, at least those about which
I know anything. (I am skirting here the vexed issue of what counts as “religion.”) As for
the boundary between Christianity and the world, in the Latin West a distinction was
made early on between the “city of God” and the “city of man,” but Augustine, who most
famously argues the point, insists that the former can never fully be known as long as we are residents in the latter. For Augustine, the two can never be fully disentangled in the present time (saeculum, the temporal realm, as opposed to the eternal, of which we only have obscure glimpses). What this means concretely is that Christians stand in a critical relationship to the temporal realm from the perspective of hope given in things as yet only dimly known, not from the standpoint of fully present and authoritative knowledge.¹ (There are, of course, Christians who will disagree. I am not a Christian, moreover, and so might be judged by some incompetent to participate in the debate. Yet the tradition, about which I fear I know more than most Christians, bears out my view.)

There’s been a presumption running through parts of the modern European philosophical tradition that the self-critical nature of Christianity leads – or will lead – to the dissolution of Christianity itself (and with it of all religion). (This final turn of the screw appears most explicitly in Feuerbach and Nietzsche. Locke and Kant, for example, had no intention of dissolving Christianity, which both of them believed to be congruent with rational claims.) Embedded here are claims both for the supremacy of Christianity (sometimes Judaism instead or as well) over all other religious traditions and an association of Christianity with the emergent secular realm, one in which rational argument is said to take the place of irrational faith. (In the terms provided by Augustine, then, Christian self-critique leads to the recognition that all we have is the temporal (saeculum); there is no eternal realm and it is irrational to believe that there is.) Christianity, according to this account, is both irrational and the ground out of which rationality emerges.

¹ From this perspective, the robust self-confidence of religion’s contemporary despisers might easily be taken for idolatrous fideism.
In one version of this argument, the secular looks a lot like liberal Protestant 
Christianity – sometimes shorn of its explicitly Christian trappings, sometimes not. The 
irrational, authoritarian, bad Christianity is then identified with Roman Catholicism. 
Since the early modern period, the distinction has also been put in terms of irrational 
fanaticism, on the one hand (Catholics again chief culprits) and rational belief. 
Yet regardless of the distinctions made – between rational and fanatic Christianity, 
Protestant and Roman Catholic – a paradox remains at the center of some of the most 
influential modern accounts of the dissolution of religion, for in Feuerbach, Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Freud – just to name the big names – somehow the irrational begets the 
rational. To go back to those who assume that critique is secular, arguments for this thesis 
rest in some way on the claim that religion (or at least Christianity) gives rise to that 
which stands in opposition to it.\(^2\)

Does this mean, then, that there is an irrational kernel within the rational? Does 
the secular not have at least some religion? And in its endless demands, is critique not 
itself fanatical?\(^3\)

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\(^2\) A number of recent secularist critics of religion, of course, want to bypass this entire 
historical narrative – both in terms of the history of anti-religious critique within the 
modern West and in terms of the role of religion itself within that critique. For these 
critics there are scientific grounds for rejecting religious belief and modern scientific 
reasoning owes nothing to Western – or any other – religion. Despite its ubiquity, this is 
an exceptionally hard argument to make. I can’t here demonstrate all of the difficulties 
involved, but merely point to the fact that for innumerable modern philosophers who 
argue against either fanaticism specifically or Christianity and religion more generally, 
the latter plays a key role in the constitution of modern rationality.

\(^3\) I think this is visible even in another crucial and more capacious account of what 
constitutes critique. Saba Mahmood urges “an expansion of . . . normative 
understandings of critique.” Whereas on the old view criticism “is about successfully 
demolishing your opponent’s position and exposing the implausibility of her argument 
and its logical inconsistencies,” Mahmood argues that “critique . . . is most powerful 
when it leaves open the possibility that we might also be remade in the process of
The paper that follows is about, among other things, the fanaticism of critique. In the paper I argue that melancholic incorporation – central for Freud to the foundation of “the self-critical” agency (later the super-ego) and hence to the foundation of moral, scientific, and cultural life – is both essential to subjectivity, community, and politics and at the same time poses a potentially great danger to these fragile entities. What I’d like to suggest here is that the promises and dangers of melancholia are precisely the same as those that come with the persistent demand for critique found within the Jewish and Christian traditions and in their putatively secular heirs. There is nothing surprising here if we follow Freud’s suggestion that our critical faculties are forged precisely through melancholic identification, idealization, and incorporation.

I suggest in what follows that the problem with Christianity – or rather the form of Christianity enacted by the medieval women whose writings I describe – is that Christ is idealized in his torture and death. I’d go much further now in two, only seemingly engaging with another’s worldview, that we might come to learn things that we did not already know before we undertook the engagement. This requires that we occasionally turn the critical gaze upon ourselves, to leave open the possibility that we may be remade through an encounter with the other.” Note here that critique as critique of something doesn’t disappear, but is turned – quite usefully, I think – against one’s own presuppositions.

Michel Foucault’s and Judith Butler’s accounts of critique arguably lead to a position very close to Mahmood’s. At their most explicit, they both define critique, like the rationalist critiques of religion I describe above, as the critique of authoritative traditions and norms. What they contest is the presumption that rationally based arguments or claims to authority can escape the dynamics of power. They go on, however, to suggest that critique is a virtue in ways that bring their arguments close to that of Mahmood. See Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 36-37. Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?” in The Politics of Truth, eds., Sylvère Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth (New York: Semiotext(e), 1997; and Judith Butler, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” in The Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy, ed., David Ingram (London: Basil Blackwell, 2002).
contradictory, directions. The first follows from the argument I make in what follows, but would explicitly highlight the abjection of Christ on the cross, his abjection before God the Father, and the dangers posed for subjects and communities by identification with such an abjected other. Beatrice of Nazareth’s rejection of bodily, and culturally feminized, modes of identification can be read in this light. If one is constituted in abjection, if the figure with whom one is called to identify is one abjected by history, the narcissistic lining of the subject will be inadequate to fend off the harsh incursions of the real.

Secondly, I’d suggest that one of the problem with Christianity – and of course not just with Christianity – lies in the extremity of its idealizations. I follow Freud in his presumption that politics and morality – critique on both the individual and the systemic level – depend on the processes of identification, idealization, and incorporation. Yet if the other the subject incorporates is perfect, how can one ever measure up? Are we, at our best, called to a state of savagely self-lacerating civilization? (The terms are inadequate, but demonstrate the ways in which Freud implicitly upsets the very binary on which he would like to rest his account of religion and the secular.) What would it mean to be just good enough? A sequel to this paper, then, might be called “Savage Civilization; Or, Why I am Glad My Brother Wasn’t Jesus Christ.”
No one in my family can tell one story without telling twenty-five, not just because one story inevitably leads to another, but because any given story is embedded with endless digressions, only seemingly incidental anecdotes, all wending their way toward some grand narrative finale, which tends never quite to arrive. (As my students know, this also tends to be the way I teach.) I am going to give you today the abbreviated, non-digressive version of the story of my paternal great grandmother, Maria Hollywood. (It will be – for me, at least – incredibly difficult.)

My mother is the one who told this story, one she had from my Grandpa Hollywood. His mother, after whom I was unwittingly named (here is the first long, omitted digression, and I promise now to stop marking each of them), my great grandmother, starved herself to death. She lived in lower Manhattan. Her bartender husband, my great-grandfather, Patrick, died young, leaving her with those of their eight children who remained alive at the time. My grandfather, Joseph, graduated from the sixth grade just after his father died, left school, and worked to support his mother and younger brothers and sisters. First he sold newspapers. For reasons that never were made clear to me, he taught himself chemistry, and went to work for a chemical salesman tied to the papers. Eventually, he co-owned a chemical sales business and made a decent amount of money (all dissipated rapidly after his death). But that was all later. Through

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4 This paper appears in somewhat different form as “Acute Melancholia,” Harvard Theological Review 99: 4 (2006): 381-406. It was initially a lecture and I have retained some of the informality of that presentation here. For the purposes of the Berkeley Symposium I have also cut long notes likely of interest only to medievalists.
his twenties he lived with his mother and one remaining sister, until, when she was sixteen, that last sister, Mary, died. And when Mary died, his mother, my great grandmother, Maria, stopped eating, refused doctors, and she too died.

There is something awful now in thinking about my mother telling me this story when I was just a small child. But the truth is, I loved my mother’s stories, even when they involved starving Irish grannies and impecunious youth, maybe in part because I never quite believed them. Now I can see all the key narrative elements—Horatio Alger meets Newsies meets a certain much beloved (to Irish Americans at least) strand of melodramatic Gothic.

So I loved the story—or was at least fascinated by it—and later could analyze its religious, political, ethnic, and gender implications, the play of power, oppression, desire, and anxiety that ran through each episode (and perhaps even more, provided the conditions of its telling). On some fundamental level, though, the older I got the less I believed it.

But the thing is, part of it at least turned out to be true. After my father died, I opened the grey lock box that I had seen on his desk for years (and oddly, given that I had rifled through every other object in the house, had never touched). I can only remember two of the documents that were in the box: my father’s flight record from World War II (it was the original flight record, now lost) and a copy, now also lost, of my great grandmother’s death certificate. Maria (Smith—therein lies yet another complex story) Hollywood died at the age of fifty-five. The cause of death: acute melancholia.

I tell this story—about the power of loss literally to kill—because it serves as a cautionary backdrop for my current research. From medieval Christian mystics to
psychoanalysis and contemporary feminist philosophy—an odd array, I grant—I have learned that one way we deal with loss is through an internalization of the lost other, who then becomes part of who we are. I am interested in the bodily, psychic, spiritual, and mental practices by which we are formed and reformed, in the role of loss and incorporation in those practices, and in the ways in which they give rise to forms of subjectivity that are always and necessarily intersubjective. (And also always and necessarily, although in complex ways, sexed, gendered, sexualized, raced, and marked by the other salient differences that constitute the social worlds of which we are a part.)

It is not an accident that the relationship between mourning, melancholia, and Christian mysticism first became starkly apparent to me—it had always been, I can now see, a crucial, if under-theorized, aspect of my work—the year that one of my brothers and one of my sisters were both very ill. I was, inevitably, thinking about mourning and melancholia and, less inevitably, reading Margaret Ebner’s Revelations. There it was—the complex interactions between trauma and loss, mourning and melancholy—enacted in and by Ebner’s book. Despite my own worries about reading anachronistically, I am convinced these complex interactions are in this text and in many others, and not just a result of me reading melancholically.

I hope today to convince you of this and to suggest the foundational role of trauma and loss, mourning and melancholic incorporation in the writings by and about two medieval women. I will then turn, albeit briefly, to what these women's stories can tell us about Freud, melancholia, and what we might call, for lack of better words, the theological imagination. To get at these questions, I need first to lay out a three or sometimes fourfold movement visible in the devotional, visionary, and mystical lives of Beatrice of Nazareth (1200-68) and Margaret Ebner (c. 1291-1351). The most striking
feature of this pattern is its movement from external objects to their internalization by the devout person (the very form of melancholy, according to Freud) and then subsequent re-externalization on the body of the believer her or himself (the rendering visible of that melancholic incorporation).

Beatrice of Nazareth was a Cistercian nun, the author of a short vernacular treatise, "On the Seven Manners of Loving God" and the subject of an extensive Latin life. Although I've written at length about the crucial differences between Beatrice's own text and the hagiography, presumably written by a male cleric shortly after her death, here I will conflate the two documents, for it is only when the two are brought together that the three and fourfold pattern in which I am interested emerges. Most crucially, the hagiographer tells us about Beatrice's use of external objects as an aid to devotion, just as he will emphasize the external manifestations of belief on Beatrice's body. Beatrice, on the other hand, is intent on describing her experience as internal and eschews discussion of external objects of devotion and of her own, externally apprehended body. Together, though, the two texts give a picture of movement from external to internal and back again that we then find repeated in fourteenth century texts like Margaret Ebner's Revelations.

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6 There is no evidence that Ebner knew Beatrice's vita or treatise. Rather Beatrice's vita and treatise and Ebner's Revelations provide evidence for commonly disseminated patterns of sanctity.
After a brief (and probably borrowed) account of the ascetic rigors to which Beatrice subjects herself, the hagiographer writes of her devotion, particularly to the cross of Christ.

Day and night she wore on her breast a wooden cross, about a palm in length, tightly tied with a knotted string. On it was written the Lord’s passion, the horror of the last judgement, the severity of the judge and other things she wanted always to keep in mind. Besides this she also carried tied to her arm another image of the Lord’s cross painted on a piece of parchment. She had a third, painted on a piece of wood, set before her when she was writing, so that wherever she went, or whatever exterior work she did, all forgetfulness would be banished, and by means of the image of the cross she would keep [firmly] impressed on her heart and memory whatever she feared to lose.\(^7\)

Not only does the hagiographer describe Beatrice as making use of devotional objects to aid in her meditative practice, but there is a proliferation of these objects, suggesting both a desire that the cross be ever present to the believer and its tendency to slip from memory in the absence of external reminders.

The wooden cross and images of the cross painted on wood and parchment ultimately, however, become unnecessary. The goal of Beatrice's meditation on Christ's cross seems to be met when she has so fully internalized the image of Christ's Passion as to be unable not to see it before her mind's eye.

Thereafter for about five unbroken years she had the mental image of the Lord’s passion so firmly impressed in her memory that she scarcely ever quit this sweet

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meditation, but clung from the bottom of her heart with wonderful devotion to
everything he deigned to suffer for the salvation of the human race. (LBN 92-93)
The hagiographer thus depicts Beatrice as having so successfully internalized that which
is represented by the cross as no longer to require external aids for her meditative
practice.⁸

Turning to Beatrice's own treatise, "On the Seven Manners of Loving God," we find no explicit reference to her devotion to Christ's cross, either as externally
apprehended through created objects or as internally present to the mind. Yet the
language Beatrice uses to describe her intense love for God can be traced to
contemporary discourses on and representations of the Passion (discourses and
representations closely tied to ancient and medieval medical accounts of melancholia). In
describing the violent and overwhelming experience of the fifth manner of loving,
Beatrice writes that

at times love becomes so boundless and so overflowing in the soul, when it itself
is so mightily and violently moved in the heart, that it seems (dunct) to the soul
that the heart is wounded again and again, and that these wounds increase every
day in bitter pain and in fresh intensity. It seems (dunct) to the soul that the veins
are bursting, the blood spilling, the marrow withering, the bones softening, the

⁸ On the tradition of meditation on the life of Christ and its goal in the internalization of
Christ's Passion and compunction for the human sinfulness that necessitated it, see
Denise Despres, Ghostly Sights: Visual Meditation in Late-Medieval Literature (Norman,
Devotional Literature and Medieval Society (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1996), esp. pp. 26-68; and Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation,
Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
bosom burning, the throat parching, so that her visage and her body in its every part feels this inward (van binnen) heat, and this is the fever of love.\(^9\)

The wounding of the heart by love calls to mind both Song of Songs 4: 9 ("You have wounded my heart, my sister, my bride, with one of thy eyes") and the piercing of Christ's side by Longinus' spear. In Sermon 61 on the Song of Songs, Bernard of Clairvaux writes that the spear, in piercing Christ's side, laid bare his heart, the very heart wounded by the glance of his beloved.\(^{10}\) Beatrice's words, then, evoke the Passion in ways that may seem oblique to modern readers but would have been clear to her contemporaries. In writing of her own heartache, moreover, she not only internalizes a mental image of the Passion, but herself comes to experience internally the suffering Christ felt on the cross (a movement of identification facilitated by the Song of Songs itself, which moves between the laments of the Bridegroom and his Bride.)

The conflation of language from the Song of Songs with events from the Passion narrative is further reinforced by the application of medical accounts of lovesickness and melancholia to the Song of Songs. While twelfth-century commentators on the Song wrestle with the problem of how lovesickness, which they considered to be a physical illness “could signify spiritual love,” by the thirteenth century, William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris, argues that the medical language of lovesickness can itself be used to

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\(^{10}\) Bernard of Clairvaux, *On the Song of Songs III*, trans. Kilian Walsh and Irene Edmunds (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979), Sermon 61, pp. 143-44.
help describe and understand mystical rapture.\footnote{Mary Wack, Lovesickness in the Middle Ages: The Viaticum and Its Commentaries (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 23-24.} The soul languishing for love of God ("for I am sick with love" Song of Songs 2:5, 5:8) becomes emblematic of mystical rapture itself and the effects of lovesickness and mystical desire are almost indistinguishable.\footnote{As Bernard McGinn shows, James of Vitry's Life of Marie of Oignies (c. 1213) is the first text to use language traditionally associated with the heights of monastic contemplation (separatus a corpore, a sensibilibus abstracta, in excessu raptæ) for trance-like states of langour, furthering the association of lovesickness (langour) with mystical ecstasy. See Bernard McGinn, The Flowering of Mysticism: Men and Women in the New Mysticism, 1200-1350 (New York: Crossroads, 1998), pp. 37-38.} Medieval natural philosophers and theologians, moreover, closely associated lovesickness with melancholia and both, it must be added, with languor.\footnote{See Wack, Lovesickness, pp. 6, 10, 12-13, 21, 35, 40, 56, 61, 160-62.} Although in the Middle Ages, melancholia is often associated with acedia and anger\footnote{For the association between melancholia and acedia (often translated as sloth, although the term as it first appears in Cassion (d. 430) and throughout the medieval period carries much more complex connotations), see in particular Morton W. Bloomfield, The Seven Deadly Sins: An Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to Medieval English Literature (Michigan State College Press, 1952), p. 430, n. 61; Stanley Jackson, Melancholia and Depression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 66-70; Juliana Schiesari, The Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and the Gendering of Loss in Renaissance Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 154-58; and Jennifer Radden, ed., The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 19-20, 69-74.} and, much less often, with envy and avarice\footnote{See Bloomfield, Seven Deadly Sins, p. 428, n. 30; and Wack, Lovesickness, pp. 12-13, 162.} -- all sinful states -- lovesickness as a species of melancholia is clearly not, or at least not always, sinful. Instead, mania, sorrow, despair, and langour (not an easily assimilable group to modern ears) are so closely associated with melancholic lovesickness that by the twelfth century, as Mary Wack explains, “the medical signa amoris came to be applied to mystical love.”\footnote{Wack, Lovesickness, p. 23.} And
not only, I argue, with mystical love of the soul for God, but also the love of Christ for humanity.

When Beatrice writes that it seems to her as if her veins were bursting, her marrow withering, her bones softening, her throat parching, and above all, her blood spilling, she borrows from late medieval medical discourses about lovesickness and melancholia. She describes herself as sick with love, not for another human being, but for God. By juxtaposing this language with that of the heart wound, moreover, she conflates the soul's love for God with God's love for the soul as demonstrated by the Son's death on the cross. For medieval medical writers within both the Christian and Muslim traditions, lovesickness as a form of melancholia (or sometimes as a forerunner to melancholia) is a malfunctioning of judgment or the estimative faculty. Like Freud, as we will see, Avicenna and those who follow him argue that the melancholic (whether lovesick or not) over-estimates his or her object. Although often read within the terms of humoral theory (a complicating factor I don’t have time to discuss today), Avicenna and his followers fundamentally agree with Freud that lovesickness and melancholy involve an over-valuation of the object and suffering in the face of one’s own inadequacy before the beloved and the beloved’s loss or absence. We can see here, furthermore, why melancholic lovesickness for God or Christ cannot be sinful, for the object of love cannot be over-valued, nor the lover ever sufficiently debased before its divine beloved.

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19 On Theresa of Avila and the attempt to distinguish loving desire for God from melancholia, and the reasons for this shift away from medieval Christian patterns of thought, see Radden, *Nature of Melancholy*, pp. 107-117. This is one of the places where I would now introduce Christ’s simultaneous idealization and debasement. I’ll leave the others unmarked, although they will be clear, I imagine, to most readers.
The tie between Beatrice's internal experience of a lovesickness reminiscent of Christ's Passion and her meditation on the Passion of Christ becomes clearer when we see how Beatrice's hagiographer chose to translate the passage of the "Treatise" cited above. As elsewhere in his rendering of Beatrice's word, the hagiographer externalizes what she describes as internally apprehended experiences.

Indeed her heart, deprived of strength by this invasion, often gave off a sound like that of a shattering vessel, while she both felt the same and heard it exteriorly. Also the blood diffused through her bodily members boiled over through her open veins. Her bones contracted and the marrow disappeared; the dryness of her chest produced hoarseness of throat. And to make a long story short, the very fervor of her holy longing and love blazed up as a fire in all her bodily members, making her perceptibly (sensibiliter) hot in a wondrous way. (LBN 308-11)

Lest this body, with blood boiling over through its open veins, seem far from the representations of Christ's Passion on which Beatrice might have meditated, we have only to turn to an image now in Cologne and probably produced in the Rhineland during the fourteenth century. Here we see Christ depicted as awash in blood, suggesting a visual rendition of the reading of Christ's Passion as lovesickness evoked textually in Beatrice's treatise and hagiography. Although we can not know if Beatrice ever saw images like this one, it is clear that a common set of Biblical and medical references enables the conflation of Christ's Passion with the love of the Bridegroom for his Bride in the Song of Songs and medieval discourses on lovesickness, such that Christ's Passion is -- iconically and experientially – melancholic lovesickness itself. In taking on that

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20 See Hamburger, Nuns as Artists, Plate 1.
lovesickness, internalizing and then externally enacting Christ’s melancholic desire, Beatrice herself shares in Christ's Passion.

As I have said, the emphasis on external objects of devotion as aides to meditation and the subsequent externalization of the internalized image of Christ's suffering on the body of the saint appear only in Beatrice's hagiography, not in her own texts. She quite explicitly emphasizes the internal nature of her experience, perhaps in an attempt to forestall thirteenth-century presumptions of the necessarily bodily nature of women's sanctity. By the time Margaret Ebner writes her Revelations in the fourteenth-century, however, women religious writers seem fully to have internalized the prescriptions for sanctity found in thirteenth-century hagiographies. For this reason, Kate Greenspan and Richard Kieckhefer have referred to books like the Revelations as autohagiographies, for they include accounts both of the internally apprehended and externally visible lives of the holy person. Something very close to the threefold pattern of internalization and externalization discerned in Beatrice's treatise and hagiography, then, appears explicitly in Ebner’s Revelations.

Ebner writes about her devotional practices and their seemingly miraculous fulfillment in ways that demonstrate the relationship of these practices to her intractable mourning over the loss of a beloved other. The close ties between lovesickness and melancholia and loss and mourning are thus starkly apparent within her book (as also are

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22 A similar pattern can also be seen in Henry Suso’s Life of the Servant, although with important difference arguably tied to gender difference. (Hence Suso insists that only he enact the physical appropriation of Christ’s passion, the women around him instead making small emblems that, when they have touched his wounded body, become objects of veneration and community formation.)
the deep resonances between late medieval devotional and mystical texts and psychoanalysis). Like Beatrice, moreover, Ebner not only comes to see and hear Christ’s suffering, but also to experience it herself. Again, in ways that Freud will later theorize in psychoanalytic terms, the infinitely valued but absent beloved is both idealized and internalized or incorporated by the lovesick melancholic.23

Ebner lived from 1291-1351, spending most of her life in the Dominican monastery of Maria Medingen near Dillingen in southern Germany.24 Her life was marked, according to the account she gives us in her Revelations, by continuous ill health and what we would now call paramystical phenomena. The illnesses begin in 1312, but the real impetus for her special religious experiences seems to have been the death of the nun who cared for her in her illness over a number of years and, a year later, her meeting with the secular clergyman, Henry of Nördlingen. (Henry would became her lifelong friend and supporter, making her the center of a loose knit group of like-minded religious people, "The Friends of God.") Up until this time in her life, Ebner describes only two experiences that might be taken as extraordinary signs of religious grace, a dream and an audition.

24 For Margaret Ebner, see Philip Strauch, ed., Margaretha Ebner und Heinrich von Nördlingen: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen Mystik (Freiburg and Tubingen: Mohr, 1882), which contains Margaret's Revelations and Henry of Nördlingen's and others' letters to Margaret as well as her one extant letter to Henry; and Ebner, Major Works, a translation of the Revelations and a prayer attributed to Margaret, the Pater Noster. The latter volume also contains a useful introduction and bibliography. Further references will be found parenthetically within the text.
The relative aridity of Ebner's spiritual life changes drastically, however, with the death of the caretaking nun, whom Ebner never names. Ebner’s mourning is intense: "there were times when I thought I could not be without my sister and could not live without her" (MW 92; ME 13). Although she claims that this sorrow was often turned to joy, she admits that she "could not actually be conscious of" this joy. The sister returns to Ebner in sleep, letting her know that she's in heaven with the Virgin Mary, the humanity of the Lord, and the divine Trinity. She promises, furthermore, that she will be there to greet Ebner on her death. Yet despite these comforting dreams, Ebner’s sorrow for her sister "was not relieved." Out of this grief, however, emerges the full range of sensory experiences of both comfort and suffering that will mark the remainder of Ebner's life.

Thus in the year following the nun’s death, in the midst of an administrative conflict in the monastery about which Ebner claims not to care, she went out to visit the convent graves (and presumably that of her beloved fellow sister). Later, she writes,

As I went into choir a sweet fragrance surrounded me and penetrated through my heart and into all my limbs and the name Jesus Christus was given to me so powerfully that I could pay attention to nothing else. And it seemed to me that I was really in His presence. (MW 93; ME 15)

This marks not only the beginning of Ebner’s multi-sensory experience of the divine presence, which will come to encapsulate not only smell, but also hearing, sight, taste, touch, and proprioreception, but also the first instance of one of the two practices that will be central to her life from that time forward, the constant repetition of the name of Jesus Christ.
Ebner insists that in her subsequent meeting with Henry of Nördlingen (1332) he spoke words of such comfort that the death of her sister was "never again as unbearable as it had been" (MW 93; ME 16). Yet immediately following this passage she describes the onset of "the greatest pain" in her head and teeth, a pain so great that she "could not bow [her] head for six weeks and all seemed bitter to [her] and [she] thought that [she] would rather suffer death each day" (MW 93; ME 16). The very intensity of this suffering, however, becomes the basis for the second great devotion of Ebner’s life, that to the person of Christ and in particular to his Passion (to be joined latter by a parallel devotion to his childhood).

Once during Lent [apparently in 1334] great desire and powerful grace were given to me to serve God more perfectly. I felt how our Lord's works of love increased powerfully in me. And I desired that my whole body would be full of the signs of love of the holy cross, as many as were possible to be on me, and that each one would be given to me with all its suffering and pain over my entire body. Still I desired that there be no member of my body not wounded with the pains of my Lord Jesus Christ. I also had great yearning to hear something about the signs of love and works of love (minnenzaichen und werken) because I felt an inner grace-filled attraction toward them. Eight days before Easter the Lord gave me a most severe and unceasing pain. In this agony I heard about the sufferings of our Lord as the four Passion narratives were being read. (CW 95; ME 19-20)
Ebner's desire for the stigmata ("the signs of love of the holy cross")\(^{25}\) entails not only a desire for visible signs of Christ's suffering on her body, but also for the pain of that suffering. Her prayer is answered by her physical reenactment of Christ's pain during Passion week (a pattern that will be repeated in subsequent years in a cycle that follows the liturgical calendar).

Ebner’s devotion to Christ's cross bears not only on her own bodily suffering, but also on her responses to auditory and visual representations of Christ's Passion. The passage cited above suggests the importance of the auditory, for Ebner first desires to and then does hear the story of Christ's Passion.\(^{26}\) She goes on to stress the role of the visual and the tactile in her devotion.

Every cross I came upon I kissed ardently and as frequently as possible. I pressed it forcibly against my heart constantly, so that I often thought I could not separate myself from it and remain alive.

This language, so strongly reminiscent of that used to discuss the dead nun who had cared for Ebner, suggests that, for Ebner, the cross and Christ on it come to replace this beloved sister in her affective life. Ebner continues;

Such great desire and such sweet power so penetrated my heart and all of my members that I could not withdraw myself from the cross. Wherever I went I had a cross with me. In addition, I possessed a little book in which there was a picture

\(^{25}\) For other examples of Ebner's desire for the stigmata, in which she explicitly invokes the famous example of Francis of Assisi, see MW, pp. 110, 127; ME, pp. 46, 78. For the fulfillment of this desire, in which Ebner "was given the sight of the five holy wounds" on her own body, see MW, p. 112; ME, p. 50. This occurs in 1339. For a more ambiguous fulfillment, in which the pain of the body wracked on the cross is invoked, see MW, p. 157; ME, pp. 132-33.

\(^{26}\) As is often the case in Ebner's Revelations, there is a clearly natural explanation for what occurs, although Ebner also seems to read it as a sign of divine grace.
of the Lord on the cross. I shoved it secretly against my bosom, open to that place, and wherever I went I pressed it to my heart with great joy and with measureless grace. When I wanted to sleep, I took the picture of the Crucified Lord in the little book and laid it under my face. Also, around my neck I wore a cross that hung down to my heart. In addition, I took a large cross whenever possible and laid it over my heart. I clung to it while lying down until I fell asleep in great grace. We had a large crucifix in choir. I had the greatest desire to kiss it and to press it close to my heart like the others. But it was too high up for me and was too large in size. (MW, 96; ME 20-21)\(^27\)

The one sister in whom Ebner confides this desire refuses to help her, fearing that the act would be too much for one as physically frail as Ebner. Yet, Ebner claims, what is not possible while awake God grants her in a dream. "It seemed as if I were standing before the cross filled with the desire that I usually had within me. As I stood before the image, my Lord Jesus Christ bent down from the cross and let me kiss His open heart and gave me to drink of the blood flowing from His heart" (MW 96; ME 21).\(^28\)

The goal of Ebner’s devotion to the name of Jesus Christ and to his Passion is suggested in these passages and very shortly attained. The following Lent (1335), Ebner explains,

\(^{27}\) Again there are clear parallels here with Francis, who desires to have Christ’s cross impressed on his heart.

The sweetest Name of Jesus Christ was given to me with such great love that by the interior divine power of God I could pray only with continuous speaking. I could not resist it. I do not know how to write about it except to say that the Name Jesus Christus was constantly on my lips. The speaking lasted until prime and I could do nothing else. Then I was silent. I could avoid speaking with other people, but I had no power to cease from this speaking. (MW 100; ME 27)²⁹

Ebner has so fully internalized her devotional practice that she is now unable not to repeat continuously the name of Jesus Christ.

A similar pattern of experience repeats itself on the auditory, visual, and tactile planes, although the process of meditative internalization is slower and involves three stages rather than two. (I am simplifying the often complex relationship between these stages for the sake of time.) First she desires to impress the cross and the Passion story onto her heart by voluntarily embracing visual images and repeatedly listening to or reading the Passion narrative. This is followed by an inability not to see Christ’s suffering. In the Lent of 1340, while at matins, for example, "the greatest pain came over" Ebner's heart (like “the greatest pain” that comes over Ebner after her apparent acceptance of her fellow nun’s death),

²⁹ Hindsley makes the choice to capitalize three words Ebner often uses to describe her experience, thereby hypostasizing them as special states: the Silence, the Speaking, and the Outcry. Although Ebner does use the words swige, rede, and rüefe to name certain experiences in which divine agency renders her completely passive, the line between actively keeping silence or speaking the name of Jesus Christ and being unable not to do these things is often less clear than Hindsley's translations allow. For this reason, I find Hindsley's capitalizations misleading and so omit them here. I don't discuss silence in this paper; suffice to say that it is a state in which Ebner is literally unable to speak, her jaw often clenching together so that nothing can pass through her lips.
and also a sorrow, so bitter that it was as if I were really in the presence of my 
Beloved, my most heartily Beloved One, and as if I had seen his suffering with 
my own eyes and as if it were all happening before me at this very moment. (MW 
114; ME 52)

Following in the meditative tradition on Christ's life and death promulgated by the 
Cistercians, Franciscans and Dominicans, Ebner seems here to have achieved a perfect 
meditatio in which external aides, be they visual, tactile, or auditory, are no longer 
required in order for Christ's passion to be viscerally present to her.

With this internalizing movement, there is also a re-externalization of Christ's 
passion on Ebner's own body. Laid out in pain in the choir and then the dormitory, Ebner 
has become a visible sign of the suffering engendered by witnessing Christ's Passion and, 
ultimately as we will see, of the Passion itself. Not only does she find herself unable not 
to repeat the name of Christ (the speaking) and not to hear of or see Christ's passion 
before her mind’s ear and eye, but she also finds herself unable to hear about or see 
Christ's death without crying aloud (the out cry).³⁰ This externalizing vocalization is often 
accompanied by other signs of the body's share in Christ's passion.

But when I was given to loud exclamations and outcries by the gentle goodness of 
God (these were given to me when I heard the holy suffering spoken about), then 
I was pierced to the heart and this extended to all my members, and then I was 
bound and ever more grasped by the silence. In these cases, I sit a long time -- 
sometimes longer, sometimes shorter. After this my heart was as if shot by a

³⁰ The complicating factor here is that the outcry first emerges around visual or oral 
representations of Christ’s Passion and then intensifies when Ebner finds herself unable 
not to see and hear of the Passion. In the latter instances, moreover, the outcry has new 
bodily components.
mysterious force. Its effect rose up to my head and passed on to all my members and broke them violently. Compelled by the same force I cried out loudly and exclaimed. I had no power over myself and was not able to stop the outcry until God released me from it. Sometimes it grasped me so powerfully that red blood spurted from me. (MW 114; ME 54)

Ebner’s identification with the Passion shifts from identification with the onlookers to one with Christ himself. With blood gushing forth from her body, moreover, Ebner so fully incorporates Christ – the lost beloved other – that she is now a visible representation of Christ's suffering for those around her.31

In a similar way, increasingly Ebner does not have to see representations of nor hear about Christ's Passion in order to be overcome by what she calls the outcry. Rather, an "inner vision" of Christ's Passion comes upon her and she is unable to restrain herself from crying out in pain and suffering. Again, these events occur particularly during Lent and with greatest intensity during Holy Week.

And that happened to me frequently at the same time because of some inner vision especially during Lent, even when I did not hear or read the Passion. On that Wednesday when I had read vespers, the entire Passion came to me again with strong outcries and exclamations. On Thursday after that at matins I was again grasped by great sincere sympathy inwardly and outwardly. Then on Friday the Passion was so really present to me while reading the office that I cried out when I read one of the hours. (MW 115; ME 55-56)

31 On the salvific power of Christ's blood and the centrality of blood in representations of the Passion, see Hollywood, “‘That Glorious Slit’,”; and Caroline Walker Bynum, Wonderful Blood: Theology and Practice in Late Medieval Northern Germany and Beyond (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
Throughout the week, Ebner was in bed, "so wounded externally from the interior suffering" that she couldn't bear to have anyone touch her. Yet she shares not only in Christ's Passion, but also in his resurrection. On Easter Sunday the nun who cared for her found her "in great joy and in good health" (MW 115; ME 56).

This pattern, of Lenten suffering followed by Easter renewal, which follows the liturgical calendar that structured the daily life and year of a Dominican nun, will continue throughout Ebner's Revelations. Christ's name and the wounds of Christ's passion are further impressed on her heart and the "rending arrows" of the Lord shoot through her heart "with a swift shot from his spear of Love" (MW 156; ME 131; here, as in Beatrice’s “Seven Manners of Loving,” language from the Song of Songs comes together with reflections on Longinus's spear). Perhaps Ebner’s most complete moment of identification with Christ's suffering occurs through her own highly particular version of the stigmata, in which she receives not the visible wounds of Christ, nor simply the pain of the hands, feet, side wound, and head wounds (caused by the crown of thorns), but a wracking of the entire body reminiscent of late medieval and early modern representations of Christ's intense bodily suffering on the cross.\footnote{See James Marror, Passion Iconography in Northern European Art of the Late Middle Ages and Early Renaissance: A Study in the Transformation of Sacred Metaphor into Descriptive Narrative (Kortrijk, Belgium: Van Ghemmert, 1979).}

I felt an inner pain in my hands as if they were stretched out, torn, and broken through, and I supposed that they would always be useless to me thereafter. In my head I felt a wondrous pain as if I were pierced and broken through.\footnote{This recalls the experience of those stigmatics who either exhibit visibly or feel the pain of the wounds on Christ's head made by the crown of thorns. For a brief discussion of the variety of phenomena associated with the stigmata, attempts to catalogue and}
seemed so excruciating to me that I began to tremble and shook so violently that the sisters had to hold me fast. I trembled while in their grasp and I felt this trembling for a long time after Easter whenever I prayed earnestly or read or talked, and I perceived the same painful brokenness in all my members, especially on both sides and on my back, arms, and legs, so that it seemed to me I was in the last throes and that all this suffering would continue until death, if it were the will of God. (MW 157; ME 132-33)

Even Easter no longer brings about Ebner's renewal. At this point, she writes, she longs for death, quoting Philippians 1: 23 and 1:21: "cupio dissolvi" ("I desire to be destroyed") and "mihi vivere Christus et mori lucrum" ("for me to live is Christ and to die is gain.")

A pattern common to a number of texts from the later Middle Ages, then, appears with stark clarity in Ebner’s Revelations. She moves from 1) active remembrance of Christ's passion, aided by the recitation and reading of scriptural texts, meditative guides, prayers, and the divine name as well as by devotional images and artifacts, to 2) an inability not to cry out in the face of this suffering and 3) the involuntary remembrance of these events, and, finally, 3) their full internalization and reenactment in and on the body. I have argued elsewhere that the meditative practices of the later Middle Ages, meant to make vivid and inescapable the pain and suffering of Christ's life and death, present a

classify them, and a perceptive account of the classical and modern literature, see Pierre Adnès, "Stigmate," DS 14, cols. 1211-43.

34 A text also cited by Beatrice of Nazareth at a crucial moment in "The Seven Manners of Loving."
curious similarity to contemporary discussions of traumatic memory. Researchers on trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder isolate particular forms of intensely sensory and bodily memories in which traumatic events are involuntarily and repetitiously relived by the survivor. Such memories are marked by their intrusive quality, intense vividness, repetitiveness, and lack of narrativization -- they are not only visual, moreover, but also often involve other senses, presumably those heightened at the moment of trauma (for Ebner the sensory associations often appear to be biblically based).

Contemporary research suggests that in situations of hyperarousal for which one is unprepared, memory is encoded in a different, more viscerally experiential manner than normal. (The scholarship is highly contentious.) These memories are not assimilated to consciousness and so impinge on it in uncontrollable and intrusive ways.

Modern therapeutic accounts of bodily memory, intent on eradicating, controlling, or

35 There are, of course, enormous dangers in making a potentially anachronistic retroactive diagnosis. Ebner's Revelations have already been put "on the couch" by Oskar Pfister, who argued in 1911 that Ebner was an hysteric. I hope to explore the differences between my move and Pfister's in a future paper. This will include dealing with the general objections to psychoanalytic readings of medieval texts and the problematization of the category of trauma. See Oskar Pfister, "Hysterie und Mystik bei Margaretha Ebner (1291-1351)," Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse 1 (1911): 468-85. For objections to Pfister, see Martin Grabmann, "Deutsche Mystik im Kloster Engelthal," Sammelblatt des Historischen Vereins Eichstätt 25/26 (1910-11): 33-34; Wolfgang Beutin, "'Hysterie und Mystik': Zur Mittelalter-Rezeption der frühen Psychoanalyse: die 'Offenbarungen' der Nonne Margareta Ebner (ca. 1291-1351)," gedeutet durch den Zürcher Pfarrer und Analytiker Oskar Pfister," in Mittelalter-Rezeption IV: Medien, Politik, Ideologie, Ökonomie, ed., Irene von Burg et al. (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1991), pp. 11-26; and Gertrud Jaron Lewis, By Women, for Women, about Women: The Sister-Books of Fourteenth-Century Germany (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1996), pp. 70-71. For a recent attack on psychoanalytic criticism, see Lee Patterson, "Chaucer's Pardoner on the Couch: Psyche and Clio in Medieval Literary Studies," Speculum 76 (2001): 638-680.

weakening its sensory strength, argue that this can be done through the process of narrativization. Complex therapies of speaking and reenacting traumatic events within controlled environments make it possible, so the argument goes, for bodily memories to be relived and reordered in meaningful narrative forms. The therapeutic claim is that such narrativization loosens the hold of bodily memories and alleviates suffering.37

Late medieval meditational practices like Ebner's, however, work in precisely the opposite direction, attempting to inculcate traumatic or bodily memory -- or something very like it -- by rendering involuntary, vivid, and inescapable the central catastrophic event of Christian history so that the individual believer might relive and share in that trauma.38 For medieval practitioners of meditation on Christ's Passion, the desire to inculcate something like traumatic memory is theologically justified by the promise that through sharing in the suffering of those who witnessed Christ's death or -- as in Beatrice’s “Seven Manners of Loving God” and Ebner’s Revelations -- of Christ himself, one can participate in the salvific work of the Cross. The biggest difference between late medieval practice and contemporary accounts of post-traumatic stress disorder, then, is that whereas the latter lacks a narrative frame, medieval practice always occurs -- at least in theory -- within the context of Christian salvation history. One might argue that through meditation on the life and death of Christ, the believer destroys all other narrative frameworks for his or her life and induces strong emotion (primarily, Franciscan treatises suggest, those of guilt, although oddly this is not theologically or affectively central in

37 For the most often cited version of this argument, see Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
38 See Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, pp. 74-97 and the literature cited there.
either Beatrice or Ebner) that can then be redeployed toward imaginative solidification of a new Christian narrative of suffering and redemption.\textsuperscript{39}

Ebner's text, in which her devotion to the Passion occurs in the midst of intense physical suffering and the loss of loved ones (not only the first nun who cared for her, but also the death of her next caretaker and that of another beloved fellow nun) suggests further possible refinements in our understanding of the relationship between memory, meditation, and trauma within medieval mystical texts.\textsuperscript{40} The central traumas of Ebner’s \textit{Revelations} appear to be physical suffering and, most crucially, mourning. Ebner's \textit{Revelations} begins and contains throughout the constant repetition of scenes of intense physical suffering and of loss. These are, however, early in the text made theologically meaningful by the assimilation of Ebner's mourning and pain to that of Christ's followers and of Christ himself on the cross. Traumatic repetition is here not simply an involuntary repetition of past losses, but marks the willed taking on and rendering meaningful of suffering.

Some attention to Freud’s conceptions of mourning and melancholy might be useful here. Freud opens his seminal essay, “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917), by

\textsuperscript{39} Meditative practice itself imaginatively recreates this narrative, one given further weight and vividness by the emotions evoked through that very practice. Yet the evocation of emotion seems to depend at least in part on an increased focus on isolated aspects of Christ's Passion -- fragmented moments and bits of Christ's body and the instruments of his suffering -- thereby working against narrativization. (See, for example, the \textit{arma Christi}.\textsuperscript{40}) This tension in the meditative tradition requires further exploration. Moreover, Ebner's constant repetition of the narrative and experience of Christ's passion raises the question of how adequate a therapy narrativization really is? Does one simply move from repeating visceral memories to endlessly repeating the story in which those memories are supposedly rendered meaningful? Although this might alleviate suffering to an extent, it does so through displacement or sublimation, a displacement that the viscerality of Margaret's desire refuses.

\textsuperscript{40} There seems to be at least some supporting evidence in many of the convent chronicles, which focus on both group and individual responses to death.
making a sharp distinction between the two reactions to loss (whether of a human being or some more abstract entity). Whereas in mourning, the bereaved is able “bit by bit” to detach herself from the beloved object, allowing other objects to replace that which is lost, in melancholia the bereaved refuses to detach from and replace the lost other. What is putatively surprising to Freud is not that melancholia occurs, but that mourning is so difficult:

Each single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought up and hypercathected, and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect to it. Why this compromise by which the command of reality [the loss of the object] is carried out piecemeal should be so extraordinarily painful is not at all easy to explain in terms of economics. It is remarkable that this painful unpleasure is taken as a matter of course by us. The fact is, however, that when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again. Despite the seemingly inexplicable detour, then, ultimately the ego returns to the pleasure seeking state in which it is “free and uninhibited,” ready to attach itself to and find pleasure with new objects.

The apparent – and unanswered – puzzle in “Mourning and Melancholia” is why the normally pleasure optimizing ego is unable immediately to relinquish its object. Yet Freud occupies himself in most of the essay with the opposite issue: why is the ego sometimes unable to mourn successfully and instead becomes melancholic? Melancholia

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42 SE 14: 245.
is marked, for Freud, by dejection, unremitting sadness, listlessness, and guilt, characteristics familiar from medieval accounts of melancholia and melancholic lovesickness. I won’t here rehearse the various arguments Freud makes in his attempt fully to distinguish mourning and melancholia. What is crucial for my purposes today is Freud’s contention that the melancholic, refusing fully to give up its object and engage in substitutions, instead identifies with the object and internalizes it.

Yet Freud describes this double movement in a peculiar way, first claiming that the melancholic’s “object-cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an end.” He goes on, however, to explain that in the case of melancholia, “the free libido was not displaced on to another object,” but instead “was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object.” In other words, Freud claims both that the melancholic readily gives up her object and that the libido released by that loss turns to the ego in the form of an incorporation of the lost object. The melancholic, despite Freud’s contrary claim, never gives up but merely internalizes the lost object. As Freud goes on to explain, this incorporation is both an extension of the ego’s narcissism and the site of a “painful wound.”

Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as thought it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification.⁴³

⁴³ SE 14, 249.
The ambivalence felt toward an object that has seemingly deserted the ego -- the hatred and love that vie with each other toward that lost object -- is now fully internalized.

In “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud argues that melancholia is a pathological state, one to which normal mourning is the healthy counterpart. We can already see, however, that the incorporations crucial to melancholia are also foundational to the constitution of the ego and to what Freud suggests is a split between the “critical functioning of the ego” and its originary repressive and narcissistic aspects. Freud argues much more explicitly for this bifurcation in the ego in The Ego and the Id (1923). There he argues that melancholic identifications and incorporations, which he had first viewed as primarily if not solely pathological, are crucial to the development of the super-ego.

We succeeded in explaining the painful disorder of melancholia by supposing that [in those suffering from it] an object that was lost has been set up again inside the ego – that is, that an object-cathexis has been replaced by an identification. At the same time, however, we did not appreciate the full significance of this process and did not know how common and how typical it is. Since then we have come to understand that this kind of substitution has a share in determining the form taken by the ego and that it makes an essential contribution towards building up what is called its “character.”

For Freud, then, the very constitution of the subject as self-reflective and self-critical depends on melancholic incorporation. This takes a particularly Oedipal caste, for ultimately it is the father who is thus internalized – and most completely, according to Freud, by men. Yet Freud’s account of melancholic idealization and incorporation in no

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way leads inevitably to his later claims, particularly found in his essays concerning femininity, that the Oedipal narrative alone governs the development of “character.” (Nor is does the deployment of the Oedipal narrative itself demand that the internalized object be the father. For both boys and girls, the mother is also lost. Freud has to do a lot of work, much of it unconvincing, to make the father the primary object of melancholic identification and incorporation.\(^4\))

Freud argues for the pathological nature of melancholia because the melancholic’s sadness, guilt, and ambivalence are so often experienced as debilitating, even suicidal. Ebner, arguably a chronic melancholic who mourns the deaths of those around her and the culturally valorized death of Christ, ends where she begins -- wishing to die. Yet the theological and existential implications of that desire differ radically. No longer a lone, ill woman mourning the loss of her fellow sister and caretaker, by the end of the Revelations Ebner is a woman thoroughly identified with Christ's salvific suffering. She has become the center of the spiritual life of her convent and of a religious movement ("The Friends of God") that sees in her the fulfillment of Christ's promises to his followers. Traumatic repetition here joins with melancholic incorporation, demonstrating the way in which incorporation can itself be a form of repetition. The Revelations, like Beatrice of Nazareth’s much less autohagiographical “Seven Manners of Loving God,” close in the midst of the holy woman’s life, with no end in sight for her cycle of suffering -- yet the hope offered by the Christian narrative is that with death, peace and joy, only

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intermittently experienced on earth, will supercede the traumatic repetitions, melancholic
identifications and incorporations brought about by illness and loss.\footnote{One is tempted, of course, to add "and by sin," assuming that to be the theological
category through which Ebner understands the necessity of the Passion; and yet sin,
oddly, plays a very small role in her \textit{Revelations}. Here, finally, is another topic that will
require further exploration and explanation before the full import of mourning and trauma
for understanding late medieval devotional practice can be assessed. For Ebner, at least,
mourning and the traumatic repetition of suffering and loss seem to supercede sin -- and
at times, even the hopes of redemption on which that repetition is theologically
premised.)

The logic of identification and incorporation, then, is remarkably similar in
Beatrice, Ebner, and Freud. The crucial difference, of course, is that by the time of \textit{The
Ego and the Id} Freud describes this process as fundamental to the articulation of the
psyche and repeatedly emphasizes throughout the 1920s and 1930s that it is the father
who is the first and primary object of identification and incorporation. Beatrice,
Beatrice’s hagiographer, and Ebner, on the other hand, describe a process of
identification and incorporation that occurs when they are adults, through grace-given but
also directed practices. For Beatrice and Ebner the idealized object of love and loss is, of
course, Christ. Through their identification with Christ and memorialization of Christ’s
Passion, they transform themselves into Christ. This gives us a key to understanding
Freud’s stake in the loss of the father, for just as Christ is the centrally valorized figure
for medieval religious women – and for medieval culture as a whole – the father may be
said to occupy a similar site within modern Western culture. But what about our other
losses? We can see clearly how Ebner displaces her other, more fully human losses onto
the loss of Christ. Is Freud doing the same when he refused to acknowledge the loss of
the mother – and other caretaking figures – in place of the father?
The psychoanalyst Melanie Klein suggests one way to broach both of the issues I raise here. In “Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States” (1940), she argues that all mourning is melancholic and that incorporation is essential to “normal” mourning. For Klein, the internalization of living others around us, as well as of the dead, is multiple and on-going. The process of loss, identification, and incorporation both constitutes subjectivity in childhood and continues throughout one’s life. Thus Klein is able explicitly to link Freud’s discussions in “Mourning and Melancholia” with those in “The Ego and the Id.” According to Klein

In normal mourning the individual reintrojects and reinstates, as well as the actual lost person, his loved parents who are felt to be ‘good’ inner objects. His inner world, the one which he has built up from his earliest days onwards, in his phantasy was destroyed when the actual loss occurred. The rebuilding of this inner world characterizes the successful work of mourning. (363)

For Klein, we learn to deal with the absence of parents and other early caregivers through a process of idealization and internalization, generating a phantasy in which they constantly remain with us and are part of us. When we experience later losses, not only do we mourn them, but our parents and other caretakers are again lost. The internal world of good objects – and their place as constitutive of our subjectivities – is damaged. Successful mourning occurs when we are able, through identification with and incorporation of the newly lost object, to rebuild that damaged inner world.

47 Klein proves useful to me here, but is also the point at which the issue of critique drops out of my discussions. I need to return to her account of aggression and its relationship to mourning and melancholy in order to work out whether – and if so how – she helps clarify the savagery of the critique itself.

Mourning, for Klein, is always melancholic, for it always involves processes of identification and incorporation grounded in a refusal fully to relinquish our lost objects. Melancholy is experienced pathologically – as ineradicable, disabling depression – when the subject has been unable as a child to establish a good inner world that will sustain her in the face of later losses. And, although Klein does not say this explicitly, melancholia also overwhelms the subject when the losses are too many, too overwhelming, for the ‘good’ parents of her inner world to combat. (This is what I imagine happened to my great grandmother.)

I would also suggest, on the basis of my work on Beatrice and Ebner, that inner worlds are not only created in childhood, but that they are created and recreated through bodily, psychic, spiritual, and mental practices. In other words, we can, to some degree at least, recreate or reshape ourselves in the image of newly idealized and internalized objects. The problem for Beatrice and Ebner, both of whom yearn for death, is that the idealized other they incorporate is idealized precisely in his suffering and death. Melancholia here feeds melancholia – the death of the other leads to the idealization of and desire for one’s own death – rather than allaying it.

I return, then, to the dangers of melancholia. I can only speculate, but I think that for my great-grandmother the enormity of her losses overcame the creative possibilities of incorporation. The lost others were too many and destroyed the self. For Beatrice and Ebner, not only the enormity of their loss, but also the very qualities of that object, led to their continued desire for death. Given these dangers, why would I want to reinstate it as constitutive of subjectivity? Why ignore the widespread disavowal of melancholia, a disavowal made not only on psychological grounds, but also theologically,
philosophically, and politically, anywhere that we talk about the resurrection as the denial of death, of successful mourning as a forsaking of the lost object, or of utopias in which all loss will be overcome? Yet as Beatrice and Ebner, Freud and Klein all make clear, to disavow the melancholic constitution of the subject is to disavow the complex constellation of others who make us who and what we are. It is to disavow our losses and our grief as well as that which supports and enables our subjectivity, our agency, and, paradoxically, our responsibility. It is to deny our responsibility to the others within, and thereby to disavow that which makes possible our relations with others outside of ourselves, the very grounds of sociality from which our ethical and political projects emerge. The trick is to find ways to sustain ourselves in and through our losses, rather than in their disavowal. What I’d like to close with today is some brief reflections on the theological implications of these claims and then with a story, the only way I’ve found, so far, to gesture toward the intersubjectively articulated, immanent transcendence that is as close as I can come to an avowal of belief.

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Even those who most admire Freud generally dismiss his writings on religion as stupidly and willfully reductionistic – and for those who know the history of nineteenth century philosophy and theology, also wildly unoriginal. Ludwig Feuerbach argues that God is a projection and reification of human capacities, values, and possibilities onto a divine other, the ideal being toward whom we as individuals and as a collectivity strive. To this Freud seems only to add, “and he’s your father.” In other words, Freud explicitly

49 Do not such promises precisely rest on the claim that critique can end? So that while I wish to understand how we can temper the ravagement of critique, I also resist the impulse to claim that critique can ever end.
Oedipalizes Feuerbach’s account of projection and reification. And whereas Feuerbach’s hope was to enable a kind of philosophical therapy whereby we might come to recognize divine capacities, values, goals, and aspirations as peculiarly human, Freud’s vision is more fully embedded in the guiding narratives of his psychoanalytic enterprise. When we recognize that it is the internalized figure of the father – the superego – that leads to our greatest accomplishments, to the heights of civilized behavior, artistic creativity, and scientific productivity, then we will no longer require religion. (Or conversely, those with the strongest superegos are least in need of religion.)

Despite critics repeated assertion that both Feuerbach and Freud reduce religion to human and psychic dimensions, I find myself wondering if they both don’t get something right – something that, curiously, has enormous theological ramifications. Freud is certainly reductionist with regard to religion, just as he is reductionist with regard to melancholy, in his suggestion that God is the projection of a lost object and the only loss we mourn is that of the father. Freud’s texts are always more complicated – and more interesting – than this reductive reading can show. Yet even if we read Freud in this simplistic way, there is something right, I think, in his suggestion that what I know of the divine I know from others around and within me – and it is the relationship between those two prepositions I don’t know yet how to articulate except by telling you another story.\textsuperscript{50}

The fact that I need to tell a story to get at the centrality of mourning and melancholia to the theological imagination (and new ways of imagining melancholic transformation) raises a host of questions – about the relationship between narrative and theory; about story-telling as a mode of incorporation and the incorporations constitutive

\textsuperscript{50} I am intensely uncomfortable with my use of theological language here and in what follows, but for the moment will keep it.
of subjectivity; about story-telling and theorizing as practices through which others are incorporated even as they are maintained in their exteriority to the subject. Arguably, what Beatrice and Ebner do is tell themselves stories. And that is what I have done today. I point to these theoretical issues as the background against which I tell another. This one requires—for reasons, again, that I need to figure out—fictionalization. It is, as you will see, more than ripe for analysis, Freudian and otherwise. Yet its as true as anything I know.

“The Goodness of Our Brother’s Heart”

They didn’t do eulogies.

The father liked often to announce that if any of his children attempted to eulogize him, he would haunt them remorselessly for the rest of their lives. The prospect was less frightening than intended—in the many years they survived him, all of his children longed for his presence, however ghostly. But still, when he died, they’d honored his wishes and kept their love to themselves.

Other losses followed, in what sometimes felt to the survivors like one long endless funeral reception. Grandmothers, aunts, uncles. Their mother. All rigorously uneulogized. A brother, who died so shortly before his mother that there was no time even to mourn. Two sisters and a brother remained. Not Mary, Martha, and Lazarus, but those names will do as well as any others.

To Mary and Martha, although they never admitted it aloud and certainly not to each other, Lazarus was an extraordinary human being. It was less his beauty they
loved—although they loved his beauty, even as it faded—than his goodness. Lazarus, however, wasn’t only handsome and good, he was also troubled and unlucky, and it was difficult for Mary and Martha to decide whether his goodness led to trouble or if the one, like the other, was a sheer, astonishing accident. For Lazarus’ goodness had no cause and no traceable source. It had nothing to do with the categorical imperative or the cultivation of virtue or a utilitarian determination of the greatest good for the greatest number. It couldn’t be taught and it certainly wasn’t hereditary. But maybe, Mary and Martha thought, it’s just that he’s our brother and we love him. Maybe he isn’t any different than anyone else.

Despite such humbling thoughts, Mary and Martha worried about Lazarus. As they lost father, mother, and brother, they each thought quietly to themselves: anything, please, but Lazarus. They were not always – at times not even often – with him, and yet, both Mary and Martha knew that he was their moral center, their moral compass of their lives.

With an inevitability that still managed to take both sisters by surprise, Lazarus got sick. All three denied it for as long as they could – not that he was sick, but that the sickness would kill him. “I’m not ready to die yet” he said to Martha.

Mary and Martha would have given up the no-eulogies rule for Lazarus, but after his death neither of them could speak—not coherently, at least, and not about Lazarus. Instead, they spoke through the songs and the readings of the Roman Catholic funeral mass his faith required. They chose passages about building an edifice for the Lord, about God as a mighty fortress, and the father’s house having many rooms. Lazarus was a builder and he had the greatest capacity for friendship and for love that either sister had
ever seen. “No matter how you feel about the Bible,” Mary said, “somewhere in there it
says just about everything.”

They thought about using the story from the Gospel of John about Jesus’ friends
Mary, Martha, and Lazarus—but under the circumstances it seemed self-serving, a public
claim to the superiority of their love for their brother over all other claimants. “More to
the point,” Mary announced in the kind of wonderful feat of projection at which she
excelled, “we don’t want to upset anyone. They’ll hear that, expect Jesus to come raise
Lazarus up from the dead, and be pissed off when it doesn’t happen.”

So Mary and Martha stuck with the father’s many-roomed mansion. They called
in their selections to the priest, an old family friend who had known their parents and
who had known Mary and Martha and Lazarus since they were children. The priest
honored the no-eulogy rule and didn’t speak directly about Lazarus. But, whether through
chance or design the sisters never knew, he read from the Gospel of John. He read the
story of Jesus’ friends, Mary, Martha, and Lazarus and of Mary and Martha’s great grief
and their great faith, and of Jesus raising Lazarus from the dead. And in his sermon, he
spoke directly to the hearts of our Mary and Martha and he told them that their brother
was not dead and that he would live forever.

But as Mary predicted, Jesus didn’t come and he didn’t raise Lazarus from the
dead, on that day or on any other that the sisters lived to see. The priest saw their lack of
faith and he spoke to it, but he couldn’t heal it, because he couldn’t bring their brother
back to them. They were heartbroken and desolate and no longer sure even of Lazarus’
goodness, now that they could no longer see it before them, sense it in the world around
them, know that it lay readily available on the edges of their worlds. The old worry—that
his goodness had been a mirage created by their love–returned, and with that doubt any possibility of a reality transcendent to the anguish in which he had died was forever, irrevocably, destroyed.

(To hear your brother cry “Help! Help!” and to have nothing to offer but the morphine that will kill him. Mary held him down–sitting at the feet of the lord–while Martha got the nurse with the syringe–and Martha was busy with many things.)

But as long as someone survives, there is always more to tell. No one ever raised Lazarus from the dead and no one ever will, but on the day Lazarus was buried an old woman and her husband told Mary and Martha a story. It was a story about their brother’s goodness, a story that showed them that Lazarus wasn’t only good in their eyes and in the reflection of their love (which in itself maybe should have been enough, but Mary and Martha were obsessed with “objectivity” and “truth,” a result no doubt of their overly-abundant philosophical educations), but he was good also in the eyes of at least one old couple. It was, Mary and Martha often said to each other in the long years they lived without their brother, a story about the kind of goodness that the man Jesus must have had; the kind of goodness that would make people tell stories about a man so good that he raised a beloved brother from the dead simply in order to staunch two sisters’ grief; the kind of goodness that has no discernable source and so renders belief in transcendence not only possible, but inevitable. Even if it can’t bring the dead back to life in the beauty and goodness of the flesh.
Perhaps no story can bear that weight without love. The woman told Mary and Martha that she too had loved their brother. He had built a house for her, the house in which she and her husband planned to live out their old age. She had dreamed of the house for years, its spaces and lights and shadows. She found the land for the house and Lazarus took her dream and drew plans. He came every week to talk over the work’s progress, to insure that her desires were met in each detail of its rendering. He gave her the house of her imagination.

As they planned and talked and gossiped, she told him about a drawer she had been lugging from house to house throughout her adult life. She’d inherited it from her mother, who had inherited it from her mother. It was full of broken and discarded religious objects. Catholic kitsch – Mary as Queen of Heaven with her crown of stars chipped, scapulars that wouldn’t stick together any more, a baby Jesus whose upraised arm had broken off. Trash, but to this pious family–grandmother, mother, aunts, maybe even a few uncles–holy and blessed objects that you didn’t simply throw away. Yet how long, the woman wondered aloud to Lazarus, do you lug a drawer full of broken Marys and Josephs and Jesuses around.

The truth is, the woman’s husband told the rest of the story because she, like Mary and Martha, could no longer speak. On the day the concrete was to go into the foundation of the new house, Lazarus came and picked up the old woman and he carried the drawer full of holy junk out of her apartment and put it in the flatbed of his truck. (This is the way the husband told the story.) Together Lazarus and the woman went to the building site and Lazarus helped her climb down into the rectangular pit he and his workmen had dug for the foundation. He followed her down, carrying the drawer.
Together, Lazarus and the old woman lay Mary and Joseph and Jesus and whoever or whatever else was in the drawer on the freshly turned dirt.

“He thought of that,” the old woman said.

(“He did it,” Mary and Martha both thought, simultaneously, to themselves.)

The man and the woman lived out the rest of their lives in the house of their dreams. A house embedded with her family’s faith. A house—in the words Mary told Martha or Martha told Mary, night after night for the rest of their lives—“a house built with the labor of our brother’s hands, with the goodness of our brother’s heart.”

Of my brother’s—my brother Daniel’s—heart.